“Sir, Before my fixed-term bond
with London Scottish matured on November 21, I was invited to reinvest the
proceeds for another year at 7.15%; an amazing and tempting offer in today’s
markets.
“On due reflection I decided
that, as with previous rates offered by Icelandic banks, it was “too good to be
true” and did not proceed. How wrong I was. I understand that this investment,
however large, will be honoured by the government.
“The moral must be to find the
shakiest bank and invest in its most ridiculously high fixed-rate bond. No
judgment or personal responsibility required, the taxpayer will take the
strain.”
-
Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, December
4, 2008.
I see soup canteens, dole queues
too
I see the boom all over for you
And I think to myself what a
wonderful world.
I see flats unsold, old bomb
sites,
Property investors receiving their
last rites
And I think to myself what a
wonderful world.
The colours of a mushroom cloud
so ghastly in the sky
Are also on the faces of people
going by
I see friends shake Guy Hands
saying: what did you do ?
They’re really saying: we will
sue.
I hear babies cry, I watch them
grow
They’ll owe much more than I’ll
ever owe
And I think to myself what a
wonderful world.
(with apologies to Bob Thiele,
George David Weiss and Louis Armstrong.)
--
So there we have it. Whether it
was the rest of us, or just the news media, we have ended up talking ourselves
into recession. Indeed the US National Bureau of Economic Research announced last week that
economic activity peaked – and that recession therefore began in the US – as
early as December last year. Their ‘Business Cycle Dating Committee’ reports that
it views “the payroll employment measure, which is based on a large survey of
employers, as the most reliable comprehensive estimate of employment. This
series reached a peak in December 2007 and has declined every month since
then.”
And Richard Lambert, director
general of the CBI and former editor of the Financial Times, went on to suggest
that journalists had spread unsubstantiated rumours about troubled financial
institutions and that the Press Complaints Commission should have issued
guidance to business journalists on the importance of accurate information amid
a crisis. But,
“Instead, there had been stories
that had alarmed savers with melodramatic language, unsourced quotes and
suggestions that problems in one institution were spreading to others.”
Perhaps the likes of Robert
Peston should always be allowed to salivate energetically, and in his case oscillate
vocally, over the failure of the latest financial institution – even when
briefed selectively by unpublished, price-sensitive sources whose first
responsibility should be to the Stock Exchange. But nobody could accuse the
(financial) media of even-handed coverage of the financial crisis, nor of the
recession / depression that now follows in its wake.
But we are where we are. Now that
UK base rates are back down to levels last seen during the Festival of Britain,
it is becoming increasingly difficult to shelter in cash, as the government’s
War on Savers moves into full throttle. Gilt yields, similarly, are starting to
look eye-wateringly slender; but they could easily become even flimsier. As
James Ferguson, Chief Strategist at Pali International, has observed:
“..all things are not equal.. the
experience of systemic banking crises and their attendant recessions suggest
that bond demand, from both non-bank investors but especially from the banks,
could explode beyond anything seen for decades, completely swamping new supply.
Meanwhile, the banks’ de-risking of assets will pump powerful deflationary
pressures into the real economy.”
The idea that banks could
comfortably absorb the colossal supply of “new” Gilts is, at first sight,
somewhat counter-intuitive – but James makes a convincing case for Gilt bulls.
Increased demand for UK government debt will likely come from two specific
areas:
“First, a normal rebalancing of
portfolio preferences in favour of a heavier weighting in government bonds, as
is quite usual in recessions and at other times of increased investor liquidity
preference.
“Second, and less obvious, it is
a feature of systemic banking crises that banks, once recapitalised by state
funds and whilst working to shrink their risk assets, concentrate their efforts
particularly on de-risking the profile of their remaining assets.”
It is certainly becoming acutely
obvious that banks remain unwilling to lend, both to individuals and to
corporations. Instead, they may simply elect to park capital in the Gilt market
and earn the essentially riskless spread of longer dated Gilt yields over
shorter ones. And as James points out, the potential for banks to absorb Gilt
supply is startling:
“..a big bank like, say, RBS
could potentially soak up this massive excess supply all on its own. RBS has
£1.95trn in total assets, of which £728bn is loans.. If we take a muted version
of the Indonesian [banking crisis] scenario, within five years it’s possible
that loans could shrink 20% to £585bn (30% of assets) whilst if Gilt holdings
increased to just 15% of total assets (they reached 45% in Indonesia), that
would imply demand of £300bn, just from RBS alone: enough to soak up our
assumed five-year excess supply of Gilts in its entirety.”
Basing an investment thesis on
presumptions, albeit well-founded ones, of future buying by third parties is
obviously somewhat fraught. Investors seeking quasi-cash alternatives and
considering Gilts can comfort themselves that in Japan, a major economy that
underwent a property and banking crisis throughout the 1990s, government bond
yields fell further than the wildest expectations of the most expectant bulls:
10 year Japanese Government bonds ended up in 2003 yielding just 0.44%.
The world, of course, is not
necessarily like Japan. We must at least hope not. But it certainly looks less
than wonderful at present. An already astonishing investment environment can be
counted upon to throw a few more surprises our way.