“I do not know
which makes a man more conservative – to know nothing but the present, or
nothing but the past.” – John Maynard Keynes, ‘The End of Laissez-faire’.
It is sometimes useful and always amusing to look back at one’s earlier
thoughts. The following piece was originally published two years ago (June 2,
2006 to be precise) – an altogether more innocent age, and from the vantage
point of Autumn 2008, seemingly aeons ago. I have made no alterations (other
than omissions for the sake of brevity) to the original and current, languidly
ironic, commentary is added in parentheses in a jaunty orange..
At
the level of the very small, making
accurate statements about “reality” is fraught, and may indeed be impossible.
According to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, in sub-atomic physics we can
know the path an electron takes, or we can know where it is at any given
moment, but we cannot know both. The very act of observation disturbs location.
Take Erwin Schroedinger’s hypothetical cat, sitting in a box with one
radioactive atom attached to a vial of hydrocyanic acid. If the particle
degrades within an hour, the vial will break and the cat will die. If not, the
cat will live. As Bill Bryson indicates in his endearing “Short history of
nearly everything” (Doubleday, 2003):
“But
we could not know which was the case, so there (is) no choice, scientifically,
but to regard the cat as 100% alive and 100% dead at the same time.”
Similarly,
at the level of the very large, making accurate statements about “reality” is
comparably fraught. In Bryson’s words again, we live in a universe whose age we
can’t quite compute, surrounded by stars whose distances from us and each other
we don’t altogether know, filled with matter we can’t identify, operating in
conformance with physical laws whose properties we don’t truly understand.
So
what does all this have to do with the markets ? At the risk of stretching an
analogy to breaking point, making any kind of explanatory declaration – even
about past market conditions, let alone current or future ones – is comparably
fraught, to the extent that there are too many market participants of too many
distinct types, all possessing an array of varied emotional, psychological, temporal,
aspirational and fundamental approaches to investments, for any one firm or
process to begin to describe the markets with anything more than a tenuous hope
of capturing ephemeral “reality”. Or to use Stephen Hawking’s words:
“one
cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the present
state of the universe precisely !”
And
Hawking at least has the benefit of scientific laws and the scientific method
on his side. Investors have to do what they can with their best sense of
informed pragmatism.
In
trying to explain why, during the month of May, equities, commodities and
emerging markets all fell dramatically, there has been no shortage of publicly
discussed culprits. To cite one proposed answer: “political convulsions in
Iran.. enormous new increases in oil prices.. limited progress in developing an
effective energy policy in the US.. reacceleration of inflation..” Each of
these factors may indeed have played a part, but the conclusion is hardly
novel, given that the testimony comes from 1979, when former Federal Reserve
chairman Arthur Burns gave a lecture entitled “The Anguish of Central Banking”.
And
if central bankers were anguished in the 1970s, their lot has barely improved
since. With economic data robust and inflation risk rising (though perhaps by
less than some recent, late-to-the-party inflationists are shrieking), the Fed
looks suspiciously behind the curve, whether or not its new chairman chooses to
give private briefings to newsreaders. US headline inflation could easily
re-test 4% year-on-year and so any pause in the monetary tightening process
ought to be temporary [inflation ! higher policy
rates ! remember those ?]. And while European and Japanese fundamentals
put less pressure on central bankers for dramatic tightening, more tightening
evidently lies ahead. It is difficult to get overly enthused about bonds in
such an environment [now it is difficult not
to].
In
trying to account for May’s market lurches, some commentators have put the
blame on Japan, after its recent announcement of an end to qualitative easing
and the resultant pressuring of carry trades funded with cheap yen. Some have
pointed the finger at fears over resurgent inflation.. Some have blamed new
public offerings for Chinese banks for sucking capital away from US markets and
threatening the US dollar. Some, inevitably, attribute the market’s slide to
hedge funds – handy whipping boys at the best of times in the absence of any
brighter ideas [no change there then];
others, to sheer complacency, or to the fact that some kind of correction was
simply overdue. Strategist Barry Ritholtz offers perhaps the most ironic
justification for recent market weakness: bull markets don’t typically end
until the last bears throw in the towel. And in early May, the bearishly
inclined Richard Bernstein of Merrill Lynch and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley
did exactly that. [Note also that Albert Edwards of
SocGen and Jeremy Grantham of GMO are now conspicuously less bearish than they
have been for years.]
In
the end, I favour the “Murder on the Orient Express” solution: they all
did it. Looking for scapegoats after market weakness is admittedly
something of a fool’s errand. What matters is assessing whether the market
environment has changed profoundly (fundamentally, however, it feels difficult
to argue that it has) – but if it has (time will tell, and
sentiment has certainly taken a beating), we should re-examine how best to
protect investment portfolios and prepare for the future. First, there seems
little point in fighting hostile central banks. In a global environment of
enhanced trade competition and generally subdued inflation outside the
commodity sector, there will come a time to increase bond duration but we are
probably not there quite yet [I feel the same way
now, but for different reasons: multiple Niagaras of sovereign debt issuance to
help bail out the banks, and anticipated slashing of policy rates to previously
unseen levels, make a compelling case for sheltering at the front
end of government bond yield curves]. Second, in an environment
of suddenly re-sensitized investors, it makes sense to pare back equity
exposure to more defensive themes. Third, taking unnecessary foreign currency
risk (read: to the US dollar in particular) seems like a dangerous luxury. [180° turnaround now required: the USD is the only game
in town, in part because it’s the only global reserve currency in town.]
Whether
the recent correction remains relatively benign or turns into something
altogether worse, one should bear in mind that it has made all sorts of assets
suddenly cheaper. Some of those “assets” will undoubtedly turn out to be
falling knives, but some will turn out to be shrewd purchases in coming months.
Lower prices in isolation – particularly if one struggles to find a compelling
smoking gun – are no reason to flee the market.
As at October 2008, I only have
one thing to add. If one’s portfolio asset allocation was sensible and
prudently diversified before the Crash of 2008, it is probably sensible and
prudently diversified now. There is obviously a premium for holding cash (and
cash proxies including short-dated high quality government bonds), because such
a policy a) conserves precious capital and b) will allow patient investors to
wade in and start carefully to scoop up bargains as the savage bear market
rolls on. In some cases in the equity market, we are already comfortably into
bargain territory. The caveat here is that there will be plenty of investors,
particularly those suffering from quite urgent time horizon constraints, eager
to sell into rallies to make up for precious losses. So expect bounces, but
don’t expect an effortless retracement to the markets’ former highs. We are
unlikely to see their like for quite some time yet – another reason to view the
equity market extremely selectively.